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SUBJECT: U/S BURNS MEETING WITH DFM NISHIDA ON IRAN,
AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, BURMA AND UN ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4
(b, d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Japan shares U.S. concerns about Russia's obstructionist role in Iran discussions and would like to play a part in pressuring Iran to abandon nuclear enrichment, Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida told U/S Burns on November 6.

U/S Burns underscored U.S. concern about Iran's involvement in Iraq and its support for terrorist groups. On Afghanistan, U.S. Burns thanked Japan for its contributions and urged increased engagement on the narcotics issue, which the U.S. sees as a greater threat than the Taliban. DFM Nishida, acknowledging Chinese sensitivities, asked for U.S. support in building a "flexible, noncommittal" process for U.S.-Japan-Australia-India cooperation. U/S Burns asked for Japanese support for U.S. initiatives in Sudan. He and Nishida agreed that the Sudan issue should be brought up in the UN Security Council while Japan is still a member. DFM Nishida reported that Japan is "not opposed" to a non-punitive resolution on Burma. Securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council remains Japan's biggest UN reform goal, he stated. U/S Burns observed that pushing UN reform would be the major focus of his upcoming meeting in Seoul with incoming UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns met with Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Tsuneo Nishida at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November

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6 to review a range of issues, subsequent to a discussion earlier in the day focused on North Korea, implementation of UNSCR 1718, and the Six-Party Talks.

Pushing for a Resolution on Iran

¶3. (C) U/S Burns stressed the importance of international unity on Iran, saying that the United States has been frustrated with the lack of consensus in the P-5 1 process. Hailing the July UN Security Council resolution on Iran as a clear mandate for action under Article 41, Burns said the United States intended to push for passage of a targeted resolution in December that would limit investment and trade in Iran's missiles industry as well as travel by officials

working in those fields. The United Kingdom and France strongly support sanctions, Germany is more or less on board, but China and especially Russia are being obstructionist, said U/S Burns. China seems to follow Russia's lead on Iran, a reversal of the roles the two countries play towards North Korea. The United States has warned Russia that its actions over the next few weeks stand to significantly affect its credibility, a message U/S Burns said he will repeat to Moscow during this trip.

¶4. (C) Diplomacy alone has failed, U/S Burns told Nishida. Iran's nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani never showed up for his appointments in New York, possibly due to having lost influence relative to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The United States is still open to a diplomatic solution once sanctions have been passed, and would support Russia's proposal that the P5 1 re-offer the June 1 package of incentives. Any diplomatic approach will be made much stronger by the backing of a new Security Council Resolution, U/S Burns stated. Japan's role will be important, and the United States intends to appeal to other countries as well, including Italy and Canada. Washington does not expect a new resolution to "fix" the problem with Iran, but rather to provide a stronger position for negotiators working toward a diplomatic solution. U/S Burns told Nishida that Secretary Rice remains willing to return to negotiations. Broad support for a new resolution could be enough to force Iran to reassess its uranium enrichment program in Natanz.

¶5. (C) Financial measures are another important tool the United States will use to pressure Iran, the Under Secretary stated. Credit Lyonnais recently decided to stop lending to Iran, joining international banks HSBC and UBS. The United States will continue these financial measures no matter what happens in the Security Council. U/S Burns thanked DFM Nishida for Japan's sacrifice in dramatically reducing its investment in the Azadegan oil field, emphasizing the importance of our newly renewed Iran sanctions legislation places on preventing foreign investment in Iran's energy sector.

¶6. (C) Asked by DFM Nishida whether a new resolution would exclude the Bushehr project, U/S Burns replied that it would depend on Russia's cooperation with the other countries in the P5 1 process. The United States is willing to support the Russian Consortium, which includes providing nuclear fuel to Iran and the removal of nuclear waste. Because the project provides these services, the United States would back a clause to exclude Bushehr from sanctions, provided Russia is otherwise cooperative.

¶7. (C) The United States is very concerned about the role Iran plays in Iraq, U/S Burns told DFM Nishida. There is evidence of Iranians on the ground in Iraq, funding and directing Shia insurgent groups. The United States suspects Iran of passing improvised explosive device technology to these same groups. Aside from its activities in Iraq, Iran is the primary sponsor of at least four of the world's largest terrorist groups. The United States is working closely with Gulf and Levantine States to oppose Iran's growing influence.

¶8. (C) Russia's credibility is definitely at stake in Iran, agreed Nishida, saying that even on the most basic of agreed-upon roadmaps, Moscow raises "ridiculous" objections. Japan shares all of the concerns that Burns raised, especially about Iran's growing regional influence and the spread of extremism. Nishida was grateful that the United States could see the significance of Japan's "difficult and delicate" decision to "pass" on Azadegan, citing it as a sign that Japan is not willing to subordinate its principles to its commercial interests. Noting that Japan has very little influence over Iran, Nishida hoped that the December election there would not make the country even more extremist.

¶9. (C) Because the P5 1 process is New York-centered, Japan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Kenzo Oshima is best positioned to engage with the United

States on Iran, DFM Nishida suggested. Nishida requested that Ambassador Bolton maintain close communication with Ambassador Oshima on the timing and content of P5 1 deliberations. When Japan loses its seat on the Security Council in December, this bilateral communication will be more important than ever, said Nishida.

U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

¶10. (C) Nishida thanked Burns for the U.S. initiative in offering to host a U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue ministerial in the western United States. However, he said it would be very difficult for FM Aso to travel outside Japan while the Diet is in session. Burns said he would also be returning to the area, perhaps in the Spring, and looked forward to meeting Nishida and DFAT Secretary L'Estrange for a political directors TSD.

Looking Ahead in Afghanistan

¶11. (C) Japan's commitment to Afghanistan is steadfast, said DFM Nishida. Ambassador Oshima will visit Afghanistan the week of November 12-16, one of Japan's many initiatives to the country within the UN framework. In support of the Afghanistan Compact, Japan provides both financial and personnel assistance, and plays a central role in the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program. Nishida said Japan is also eager to finish the Ring Road, thanking Burns for U.S. assistance in identifying a contractor.

¶12. (C) There is no overstating the importance of international support to Afghanistan, U/S Burns replied. The United States is optimistic about the country's future. The multinational coalition is making great headway in beating down the Taliban, even in the face of great sacrifices, like Canada's 42 casualties. The quick development of infrastructure in Afghanistan is critical to the delivery of aid. This is especially important because of the current explosion in opium poppy cultivation. U/S Burns said that Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai is not responding as well as we would like, and faces a future of increasing corruption and crime as a result. He thanked Nishida for the Diet's efforts to enable Japanese contributions to Afghanistan and asked for increased engagement from Japan on the narcotics issue, which the United States sees as a greater threat to the country's stability than the Taliban. One possible model for assistance is the U.S. effort to support the import of products from Afghanistan's border areas, dubbed "Reconstruction Opportunity Zones."

¶13. (C) When Nishida asked about the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan's instability, Burns replied that Pakistan is a good partner in the region. The United States has sympathy for the challenges that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf faces in trying to control his country's border with Afghanistan -- provinces of Pakistan that are effectively in open revolt against the government. In spite of instability in Pakistan and the loss several hundred soldiers in counter-terrorism operations, Musharraf has continued to press ahead in cracking down on lawlessness in the border region. Burns pointed to Musharraf and Karzai's attendance at a White House dinner party as a symbol of the two countries' attempt to develop better cooperation.

Engage India without Alienating China

¶14. (C) India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's December visit to Japan will be a historic event that shows Japan and India's deepening bilateral relationship, DFM Nishida told the Under Secretary. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has a strong personal interest in India, and when Singh was an economist he focused on Japanese economics. Motivated by these experiences and the obvious strategic benefit of cooperation, the two leaders are expected to continue moving

their countries closer together. In addition, Abe is now considering proposing a forum for Japan, the United States, Australia, and India to meet quadrilaterally. This would not replace the TSD framework, and could encompass non-security issues, such as energy and trade. Japan is aware of the sensitivity of this idea for China, and presenting it as a Japan- and India-led initiative might be "strategically clever," said Nishida. Nishida asked U/S Burns for U.S. support in building a flexible, non-committal process for the four countries to collaborate.

¶15. (C) President Bush and Prime Minister Abe both recognize the strategic importance of India. The U.S. Senate will consider the legislation for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear initiative soon, said Burns, and the United States hopes for Japan's support in changing Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines. The United States is interested in quadrilateral discussions, but India may be hesitant and we have concerns about China's reaction. Burns said he would talk to Secretary Rice about the proposal so she could be prepared to

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discuss it further at the Hanoi ministerial.

International Action Critical in Darfur

¶16. (C) The United States is very concerned about the situation in Darfur, U/S Burns commented. This is an important issue for President Bush. U.S. Special Envoy Natsios' recent visit to the Sudan confirmed that the situation is getting worse and could expand into a regional crisis. The United States is determined to get an international force into the Sudan, and is proposing a hybrid United Nations/African Union force. Burns asked Nishida to back this proposal, continue food and medical assistance, and support the Southern Peace Process.

¶17. (C) Although its influence in the Sudan is limited, Japan will continue to voice its concerns, DFM Nishida replied. The visit of Japan's own special envoy to Sudan was not a 100 percent success, but the Japanese believe that the Sudanese government understands their position. Sudan Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail was in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Burns-Nishida meeting, Nishida observed, and FM Aso would use the opportunity to keep the pressure on Sudan.

¶18. (C) The Sudan issue should be brought up in the UN Security Council while Japan is still a member, agreed U/S Burns and DFM Nishida. Noting the influence China enjoys in Sudan because of its oil investments, U/S Burns said he would raise the issue in Beijing later during his trip. This could be a chance for China to use its influence for something other than commercial purposes. U/S Burns suggested that Japan might take advantage of its "new-found friendship" with China to do the same.

A Non-Punitive Resolution on Burma

¶19. (C) The United States will present a non-punitive resolution on Burma to the UN Security Council this December, U/S Burns observed. First Lady Laura Bush takes an active interest in Burma, and Security Council action would strike a powerful blow for human rights, he said. The United States appreciates Japan's help in getting Burma on the UNSC agenda, and hopes that the two countries will work together on this next step. The United States is worried that UN Undersecretary-General Ibrahim Gambari, who Burns met the last week of October, will be manipulated by the regime during his November trip to Burma. Gambari said he has the junta's assurances that he will see Aung San Suu Kyi. If Gambari's trip is unsuccessful, there will be more reason than ever to push for a UNSC resolution. Ambassadors Bolton and Oshima must work together, said the Under Secretary. Without Japan's support, the U.S. strategy would be very difficult.

¶20. (C) Japan is not opposed to a non-punitive resolution, said DFM Nishida. The continuing deterioration of the situation in Burma has forced Japan to re-examine its policy.

Japan will wait for Gambari's report, and if it is not positive, then it is time to "go a step forward," Nishida explained. Japan is increasingly frustrated with China and India's growing presence in Burma, and would like to work more closely with the United States. Nishida requested that Japan be provided a copy of the proposed resolution as soon as possible.

UN Reform and a Permanent Seat

¶21. (C) U/S Burns explained that the primary purpose of his upcoming meeting in Seoul with incoming UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon is to push for UN reform. The United Nations is riddled with problems, including the "spectacular failure" of the Human Rights Council. Burns said he would address Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council along with these other issues during his meeting with Ban. Japan is the only country that the United States supports permanently adding to the Security Council, he emphasized. Japan expects Ban Ki-Moon to make his "utmost efforts" to reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, said DFM Nishida. Prime Minister Abe has made it clear that a permanent seat on the Security Council is one of Japan's most important foreign policy goals. Abe will bring this issue up in Hanoi during the APEC ministerial.

The WHO Short List

¶22. (C) Japan's candidate for Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr. Shigeru Omi, is one of the United States' top five candidates, U/S Burns told Nishida. DFM Nishida replied that Dr. Omi is one of his close friends and argued that he is the best candidate. Japan would fight hard to see Dr. Omi elected, said Nishida.

Iraq

¶23. (C) The United Nations must pass a resolution by December 31 on Iraq to extend legitimization of the presence of coalition troops, U.S. Burns noted. He asked for Japan's support for such a resolution. He thanked Nishida for Japan's strong contribution of the C-130 airlift. DFM Nishida said that Japan and the United States had the same interests in Iraq: a successful exit and enduring stability. Although Japan's role is bound by legal limitations, Nishida hoped that the United States and Japan would continue their close collaboration in Iraq.

¶24. (U) Participants

United States

¶R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
¶J. Thomas Schieffer, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy
Mike Meserve, Political Minister Counselor, U.S. Embassy
Dr. Victor Cha, NSC Director for NE Asia
Sung Kim, Director, EAP/K
Steve Fagin, Special Assistant to U/S Burns
Scott Hansen, Embassy Notetaker

Japan

Tsuneo Nishida, Deputy Foreign Minister

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Chikao Kawai, Director General, North American Affairs
Bureau, MOFA
Hideki Ito, Deputy Director General, Middle Eastern Affairs
Bureau, MOFA
Takehiro Funakoshi, Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator,
Foreign Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Shigeki Takizaki, Director, UN Policy Division, Foreign
Policy Bureau, MOFA
Takeo Mori, Director, 1st North American Division
Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Division (Acting Director of Non-Proliferation, Science and
Nuclear Energy Division)
Tomofumi Nishinaga, Principal Deputy Director, Economic
Cooperation Bureau Grant Aid and Technical Cooperation
Division
Takatoshi Mori, Deputy Director, 1st North American Division
(notetaker)

125. (U) This message has been cleared by U/S Burns.
SCHIEFFER